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CHARTER OF BIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
WK.ITS OF ASSISTANCE - KEASONABLE SEAR.CH 
Regina v. Cuff - County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver Registry 
CC821838 June 1983 
The accused, Cuff ~ {a known trafficker in heroin) was, according to 
informants, again plying his trade despite a previous conviction for 
this practice. As a result of this information, the accused was 
placed under surveillance. He was seen to meet a man and proceeded 
home via a round about route. It was decided that the accused 
probably had taken a delivery of narcotics or drugs and was approached 
by police while he was still sitting in his car in his own driveway. 
He was pulled out of the car through the open window and his mouth was 
searched in the usual fashion (All of this happened in "bli tz-krieg" 
style before the accused had time to shut off the engine or secure the 
transmission. While Cuff was saying "ah" to the officers in the 
driveway, his car went home on its own but failed to stop when it 
reached the back wall of the garage). Nothing was found on the 
accused. An officer with a Writ of Assistance was called in and the 
house was searched. 
Police controlled the residents of the home (unfortunately the offi-
cers testified that they 'detained' these other persons) while the 
search was conducted. During the search a bargain was struck with 
Mr. Cuff. He was promised that no charges would be preferred against 
anyone else in the house if he would tell them where he had the 
heroin. Cuff accepted and led police to his now well ventilated 
garage where behind a wooden board he had a quantity of the narcotic. 
This led to further bargaining. Cuff was promised that no charges 
would be laid in respect to his "possession of the heroin for the pur-
pose of trafficking" if he would "get a Mr. X along with one ounce of 
heroin". Although Cuff, in his attempt to get Mr. X, supplied useful 
information to police, he failed to meet the objective of the deal. 
As a consequence he found himself charged with possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
During his trial some very interesting points were raised by defence 
counsel who claimed that the evidence of the heroin should be 
suppressed due to several violations in respect to the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. He also urged the Court; in the alternative, 
to enter a stay of proceedings as the case amounted to an abuse of the 
process of the Court. 
In regards to the abuse of process the defence claimed that the 
accused faced the charge because he failed to nail the bigger fish 
(Mr. X) for the police but not because he was in possession of heroin. 
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In support of this argument defence counsel cited the well known 
Smith* case. Smith had made a deal with police also. In return for 
surrendering a cache of dope to police he would not be charged in 
respect to dope he was found to be in possession of. Police kept 
their word but charged him with conspiracy in regards to possession of 
the cache of dope. 
The Supreme Court of this Province found the conspiracy charge against 
Smith, in view of the deal, an abuse of the process of the Court. 
An ordinary man, after having made such a deal would feel safe and be 
astounded when, after having lived up to his part, charges of 
conspiracy could be proceeded with, said the Supreme Court Justice. 
The County Court Judge, held that the circumstances in this Cuff case 
were distinct from those in R. v. Smith. Police had pledged not to 
charge anyone in the house and they didn't. The foregoing of the 
charge against Cuff for possession for the purpose, was conditional on 
him get ting Mr. X, the bigger fish. He didn't and police went ahead 
with the charge. The Judge concluded in R. v. Smith police had not 
lived up to the bargain but in this case they did and therefore he 
found that there was no abuse of the process of his Court 
This left the Court to deal with the claims that police had offended 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. If those violations, if any, 
would bring the administration of justice in disrepute, the evidence 
of the heroin would have to be suppressed. The alleged violations 
were as follows: 
1. The accused and those detained in the house during the search had 
been denied their right to counsel; and 
2. The use of the Writ of Assistance to search the home and to 
detain all those persons found in the home constituted an 
unreasonable search. 
The Court was quite exhaustive in giving reasons for judgment and 
explored the law as it was before the Charter became effective and 
what it has been since. The assurance to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure is new and was not found in the Bill 
of Rights (1960). Therefore, Writs of Assistance and their use were 
seldom challenged in the Courts. However, the judiciary and various 
authors were in the pre-Charter times not silent on the subject. The 
writs were issued by the Federal Court to officials and R.C.M.P. 
officers under the Food and Drug Act, the Narcotic Control Act and the 
Customs Act. The Judges of that Court have been very vocal at times 
when an application, or for all intents and purposes, an order to 
issue a Writ was before them. In January of 1978 I wrote a synopsis 
of one of these judicial objections to the law by Mr. Justice Collier. 
* Regina v. Smith CRNS Volume 30 p. 383 
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To understand some of the arguments that surround the infamous Writ of 
Assistance, it seems apropos to insert that synopsis here: 
Writs of Assistance 34 c.c.c. (2d) 62 Federal Court Trial Division 
The Federal Minister of Justice applied to the Fe~eral Court to 
issue a Writ of Assistance to an officer of the Customs and 
Excise Investigation Division. 
Mr. Justice J. Collier, then a "newcomer" to the Federal Court, 
entertained the application and was apparently shocked and dis-
mayed with: the lack of judicial discretion; the wide and sweep-
ing powers such a writ gives to the officer; and the fact that 
the application was void of any facts which might indicate the 
reason for the officer's need for such a writ ~ The Justice's 
research revealed that a person who exercises the powers con-
ferred on him by a Writ of Assistance, exercises powers given to 
him by Statute rather than executing a judgement by the Court as 
is the case with a search warrant. The Minister of Justice or 
the Minister of National Health and Welfare can apply to the 
Federal Court for a Writ of Assistance to be issued to a specific 
"officer". The Court, upon being satisfied that the person is 
"an officer" has no alternative but to issue the Writ. 
The Justice agreed with Justice P. Jackett's response to an iden-
tical application in 1965. He also objected to this procedure. 
The Customs Act stipulates that a Justice of the Federal Court 
may issue a Writ of Assistance upon application of the minister 
mentioned above, while the other Acts stipulate that he shall 
issue the Writ upon application. The "may" is meaningless as 
there is nothing upon which to base any judicial discretion. 
Even if it was up to the judiciary to determine if there was a 
need for the officer to have a Writ» or if the officer was a 
suitable person to exercise the wide powers of search all through 
his career without a limit, the exercise to determine these 
things would be useless. How can you determine that the officer 
will properly exercise his immense power 10 or 20 years from now? 
Mr. Justice Collier, granting the applicat!on, protested the wide 
powers the Writs give, the impropriety for any person to be 
clothed with such immense powers and the seeming perpetuity of 
"these untrammelled" writs. He was mindful of the recent abuses 
of power by the executive branch in the U.S. which more than any-
thing motivated him to remind us of ministers who may apply for 
the Writs for persons to use them for political, administrative, 
social or economic reasons. 
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The County Court Judge was in total agreement with these views and 
added his own observations. He reminded that when a Writ of 
Assistance is used to search, the contraband seized does not have to 
be taken before a justice as is the case with a search warrant; the 
search can be carried out any time while a search warrant, unless it 
specifically states otherwise, may only be executed during the day, 
etc. He concluded: 
"In my view, the use of the device of a Writ of Ass is tance 
clearly offends section 8 of the Charter". 
He also held 
"Reading section 8 and section 52( 1) of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms together, I find that Section lO(l)(a) 
of the Narcotic Control Act is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution and, in the words of 
section 52(1), to the extent of that inconsistency, of no 
force and effect'"· 
The Judge said to be mindful that 
"The detection of criminals is not a game to be governed 
by the Marquis of Queensbury Rules"* 
but conunented that the Writ of Assistance was used in this case while 
there was sufficient time to obtain a search warrant from a justice. 
He was firmly of the opinion that 
" ••• the law without section lO(l)(a) will not be any less 
e ffectively enforced by the police. Where there is time 
and opportunity to obtain a judicial warrant and one is 
not obtained, where t .here is a detention of innocent 
people without any warning by virtue of the use of such 
writ, where there is no power of judicial review in the 
first instance, then I think the answer to the question of 
whether this conduct would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute becomes self evident". 
In the circumstances as they were here, the evidence was ruled 
inadmissible on account of an unreasonable search. 
Accused acquitted 
Comment: In this case the defence raised a number of issues at the 
conclusion of the trial, one of which was the "abuse of the process of 
* Mr. Justice Horner in Rothman v. The Queen (1981) 59 C.C C. 74 
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the Court". When a judge finds that there is such abuse he can remedy 
it by ordering that the proceedings be stayed. Usually when that 
issue is raised it is dealt with first. Afterall, if there was abuse 
of the process and the proceedings are stayed all the other submis-
sions are superfluous. 
In this case however, the Court found that there was no abuse as the 
Crown had lived up to its word in that it had not charged any other 
person who was in the house at the time of the search and as it would 
not charge the accused if he set up Mr. x. He failed and got charged. 
Firstly, it was not the Crown that made the commitments to the accused 
but police. The two are by no means synonimous. However, for the 
purpose of the issue at hand the distinction may well be academic. 
It is the second "deal" police made with the accused that is of inter-
est. Whether or not they lived up to their commitments may make the 
matter not any less an abuse of the process. What, in principle, is 
different in the "deal" made here or the referring of a charge when in 
the first instance resulted in & "diversion contract". In 1978 the 
Supreme Court of this Province refused to order a Provincial Court 
Judge to try a Ms. Jones* after he had stayed the proceedings. Ms. 
Jones had breached the diversion contract she entered into to avoid a 
charge related to possession of a narcotic. The Provincial Court 
Judge had held that the matter was before him because she breached the 
contract and not because of possessing the narcotic. Needless to say 
in the Jones case there was more in issue than in this case, the 
system had been short circuited by the executive branch of government 
exercising a function exclusively assigned to the judiciary. The fact 
still remains that the breach of contract was what offended the Crown 
and not the original alleged offence. 
In essence the accused Cuff was before the Courts because he did not 
get Mr. X and not because he possessed heroin. When a person, because 
he refuses or is unable to make restitution to his victim, is charged, 
it must be assumed that the kernel of the State's indignation is the 
refusal rather than the crime by which the harm or damage was caused. 
Many arguments are possible to show that these instances are distinct 
from one another but not in the basic criterion for an abuse of pro-
cess for not living up to a '"deal". Consider that, in the case of 
Ms. Jones, there wa.s a deliberate breach of her diversion contract. 
Yet her being consequently charged was considered an abuse of the 
court's process while in the case of Mr. Cuff, who may have done his 
darnedest to set up Mr. X but failed, the process was not abused. 
However, Courts have been generous in allowing police considerable 
latitude to ferret out crime. Perhaps this Judge was generous or 
wanted to get around this obstacle to deal with the Writs of 
Assistance which, no doubt, is a more interesting topic. 
* R. v. Jones 3 W.W.R. [1978] 271 
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Another point to ponder is if this Court held that the search was 
unreasonable because the Writ was used or because the Writ was used 
while there was time for a judicial warrant. I think the former is 
the case. On page 13 of the reasons for judgment, the Judge begins 
his very interesting views and version of the Writ's history and its 
constitutionality by posing the following question: 
"Now, is the use of a Writ of Assistance a violation of the Charter of 
Rights simplicites?" On page 19 he concludes that the provision in 
section lO(l)(a) of the Narcotic Control Act to search with a Writ of 
Assistance is so out of step with the Charter that it is of no force 
and effect. On the same page the judge concludes: 
"In my view, the use of the device of a Writ of Ass is tance 
clearly offends section 8 of the Charter". 
I would suggest that he answered his own question with "Yes". 
Another matter of interest is the Judge's views of police holding 
innocent people in custody without warning or access to counsel while 
they conduct their search. I think the word "reasonable" plays a 
major role in the control of people during a search of premises. 
Many times the Courts have dealt with this question. One case I 
remember reading (but cannot cite) was by a Court of Appeal on 
whether or not police officers had been in the lawful performance of 
their duty when they controlled the persons who were, at the time the 
search began, at tending a party at the premises. To the best of my 
recollection, police were looking for stolen jewellery. The Court 
held that the search was legal and would have been totally frustrated 
if people were allowed to mill around and come and go as they 
pleased. It was held that if police had been reasonable in the length 
of time they inconvenienced and treated the guests they were in the 
lawful performance of their duty. The control over the occupants was 
essential and was an ancillary _power to the search. 
It seems that if the control of the occupants of the house was 
reasonable, there would not have been an abuse of power. Of course, 
the Judge held that the Writ was illegal to use and this perhaps made 
also the control unlawful. 
* * * * * 
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FALSE IMPRISOllKERT 
Re Butt v. Saint and Loveless, Newfoundland Supreme Court Trial 
Division 
Mr. Loveless was on his way to his girlfriend's, when he saw a man 
coming out of a beauty salon. When he returned shortly after the 
police were at the beauty shop investigating an armed robbery. A 
young man who had his face covered with a ski mask had used a handgun 
to persuade the lady in the shop to turn the contents of the cash 
drawer over to him. Mr. Loveless gave police a description of the man 
he saw leaving the shop and it matched closely the description t.he 
"lady" gave of the robber. Loveless accompanied police to the station 
and was given a book with mug shots and he identified the person he 
saw coming out of the shop. The description of the person in the 
picture and that given by Loveless and the "lady" were very close. 
However, as it turned out the person in the picture was arrested just 
a few hours before the robbery took place. 
Police asked Mr. Loveless to notify them should he spot the robbery 
suspect. A couple of weeks later Mr. Loveless phoned police to say he 
was in a shopping mall and he had spotted the young man he saw coming 
out of the store. Although the suspect had flown the coop when police 
arrived, his name was obtained from a shop where he had done some 
business. This person was the 18 year old Mr. Butt, who lived with 
his parents close by the beauty shop. A search warrant was obtained 
and executed. Nothing was found that connected the suspect to the 
robbery, but it was discovered that Mr~ Butt Sr. had a gun collection 
and Mr. Butt Jro did closely resemble the description given by the 
"lady" and Mr. Loveless on the day of the robbery. 
Mr. Butt Jr., (the plaintiff in the consequential litigation against 
the police and Mr. Loveless) was asked to accompany police to their 
office. He was placed in the rear of the police car which had inside 
door handles. As a matter of fact, Mr. Butt left the car briefly 
prior to it being driven off, to consult with his father. At the 
police station Mr. Butt was placed in an interview room and was left 
alone there for some time. The room could not be opened from the 
inside without a key. 
After this, Mr. Butt was placed in a "line-up" and was positively 
identified by Mr. Loveless as the person he saw coming out of the 
beauty salon on the day of the robbery. The "lady" also identified 
Mr. Butt, as he had a height, weight and hair colour identical to the 
man who robbed her. As a result Mr. Butt was arrested for armed 
robbery and a few hours later taken before a Provincial Court Judge 
who remanded him to the following morning for a bail hearing which 
resulted in the release of Mr. Butt. 
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Although it all seemed clear sailing from there on in, the Crown did 
Th)t have filUCh Of a Case left When it WaS diSCOVered Subsequent tO this 
investigation that the star witness, Mr. Loveless, was recently 
convicted of armed robbery and was awaiting sentencing. Mr. Loveless 
approached police after Mr. Butt was charged and said to expect some 
representation to the probation officer who was preparing his pre-
sentence report. Furthermore, Mr. Loveless also expected the money he 
claims was offered to him by the investigating officers. 
Needless to say, Crown Counsel had a problem and Mr. Butt who elected 
to be tried by Judge and Jury, was dismissed at the conclusion of the 
preliminary hearing. Mr. Butt then petitioned the Supreme Court to be 
compensated by the police officers and Mr. Loveless for false impris-
onment (for the period from accompanying police from his home after 
the search until he was released on bail on the afternoon of the 
following day) and malicious prosecution. 
The Supreme Court dismissed the claim of malicious prosecution as it 
had not been without reasonable cause. However the Court awarded Mr. 
Butt $500 for false imprisonment. The Justice found that only the 
period that Mr. Butt was held in the interrogation room was imprison-
ment for which there was no authority without firstly arresting him. 
Police were in a position to have made an arrest but had not done so. 
In everything that happened during the investigation, Mr. Butt was a 
co-operative and voluntary participant who did not need to be and was 
not to be restrained. Said the Supreme Court Justice: 
"For their own protection the police should make it clear 
to any witness, particularly a suspect, that he or she is 
free to leave at any time. Whether they do so or not is 
their own business. More important than that, however, 
where a person is not under arrest whether he be a suspect 
or not he must not be kept behind locked doors without his 
consent. The doors of the interrogation room should have 
been left open or unlocked. They were not". 
The Court concluded that police had acted properly with the exception 
of that brief period of incarceration in the interview room. 
* * * * * 
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POSSESSION OF ADTOMOBILE HASTERKKY 
IS A COAT BANGER. INCWDED? 
Regina v. Young l c •. C.C. (3rd) 395 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused was found standing next to a car in the underground park-
ing lot of an apartment ccmplex. When a security guard appeared he 
ran. When apprehended he was found to be in possession of a coat-
hanger bent and twisted in such a way that it could he used to unlock 
cars by pulling up the door latches. The accused was consequently 
tried for possession of an automobile masterkey contrary to section 
311 C.C. and acquitted. The Crown appealed o 
Section 311 C.C. prohibits the possesslon and sales of masterkeys for 
automobiles other than by persons licensed and audited by the Attorney 
General of a province. The Court of Appeal held that the Ontario 
Attorney General was not likely to issue licences and administer the 
distribution of coathangers. The gadget the accused 'fabricated was 
obviously not covered by the section despite the inclusion of the 
words "or other instrument designed or adopted to operate locks of 
motor vehicles" in the definition of masterkey. 
* * * * * 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Acquittal upheld 
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POSSIBLE BREATHALYZER FLAW 
EVIDEMC~ TO THE CONTRARY? 
Regina v. Stewart - County Court of Yale, Penticton Registry No. 4/83 
(349) May 1983 
The officer asked, "Do you know why you are stopped?" and the accused 
had replied: "Because I'm impaired". A while later the Borkenstein 
breathalyzer confirmed this and readings of 180 and 160 mlg. were 
obtained. Yet the accused was acquitted of "over 80 mlg", and the 
Crown appealed. 
The Crown, of course, relied on the provisions in section 237 c.c. 
which state that the results of analyses done within two hours of 
driving are, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of the 
accused's blood-alcohol level when he drove. The defence had subpoen-
aed a pharmacist employed in the R.C.M. Police Laboratory. The day 
after the accused was tested the manufacturer of the Borkenstein 
breathalyzer issued a bulletin warning that the instruments "may be 
affected in an unpredictable manner by various radio frequencies and 
power levels, which might affect the result of any test by such a 
machine". The lab technician had immediately experimented. He said: 
• holding a portable transmitter close to the breath-
alyzer, the affect is of the nature of a hundred milli-
grams percent on that breathalyzer but by placing my hand 
just in the path, it was reduced to zero". 
He concluded: 
". • • so the problem is a hyper-variable problem. It's 
erratic and unpredictable in that sense". 
The Crown had not tested the breathalyzer used to analyze the 
accused's breath. 
The County Court Judge held: 
• it was not unreasonable for the trier of facts in 
this case to find a reasonable doubt based on those tests 
done by that expert" 
Crown' s appeal was dismissed 
Acquittal upheld 
* * * * * 
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IS A VOIB. DIRE AN IHDEPENDEHT TRIAL 
Regina v. Morris, County Court of Prince Rupert, May 1983, No. C.C. 
10/83 Terrace Registry 
A police officer went through the regular routine of giving evidence. 
He identified the accused and a little further in the evidence the 
Court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of a state-
ment the accused gave to the officer. 
The trial Court had refused to give the statement any consideration to 
reach a verdict, because the officer had failed to identify the 
accused in the voir dire. The Judge held that a voir dire is an inde-
pendent trial and the failure to identify the accused during that 
trial meant that there was no e-'7idence that the accused in the main 
trial and the pe:cson who gave the statement were one and the same. 
The Crown appealed this decision. Quoting from other reasons for 
judgement* on this issue the County Court held, "that it is not neces-
sary that there be a repetition of identification evidence within the 
voir dire itself or indeed that such identification evidence must 
precede the voir dire so long as at some point in the trial the state-
ment is unquestionably linked to the accused". 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Hartley 1980 Vancouver Registry CC 791609 
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WHAT IS THE MEANING OF •FRAUDULEN'r-? 
Regina v Dalzell 3 c.c.c. (3d) 232 
County Court of Halifax 
The accused was observed to place nearly $80 worth of merchandise in 
her brief case which she had on the bottom of her shopping cart. She 
left the cart near the front of the store, took her briefcase and 
walked out. She was apprehended by the store security person. 
At her trial for theft under $200, the accused testified that as a 
mature student she was assigned to work in a community program known 
as "Save the Children". The program was similar to "Scared Straight" 
to deter juvenile delinquency. Part of this program was involvement 
in a "Stop Lift" project designed by local merchants and police. The 
information she received from the children, who all had at least one 
conviction, indicated that the "Stop Lift" did not work. The altera-
tions she had suggested to the project were rebuffed. The accused had 
become emotionally involved in her crusade and to prove tb the mer-
chants that there was a better way to reach their objective she set 
out to demonstrate that their program was no good. She testified how 
she intended to go to stores, 
". • • take items, leave the store, list them and go back 
and say to the manager, or whoever was in charge, now will 
you listen to me - I have an alternative. It might work". 
The Provincial Court Judge acquitted the accused and the Crown 
appealed. 
The County Court held that the accused's explanation was not rebutted 
and must be believed. Therefore it must be determined if a person who 
carries away property with the intentions the accused had, does commit 
theft. Said the Court: 
• • it would take a very rigid mind to characterize her 
conduct as dishonest or immoral other than in the sense of 
grossly imprudent". 
The kernel of the question remaining is whether depriving a person 
"temporarily" of property in circumstances as these is "fraudulent" as 
these words are used in the definition of theft (section 283(1) 
C.C.). The first one was no problem; since 1955 the words 
"temporarily or absolutely" replaced the word "permanently" in regard 
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to depriving an owner of property. Whether the taking was "fraudu-
lent" created a greater problem. The definition exempts persons who 
take property with a "Color ot right". This simply . means that a 
person has an honest belief that the property is his, or that he has a 
right to it or that the owner has consented or will consent to the 
taking of it. Needless to say that.if there is a color of right the 
taking is not fraudulent. 
The accused without telling what she intended to do, had phoned the 
store manager and asked him about his policy regarding shoplifters. 
He had said that if there were no extenuating circumstances the shop-
lifter would be given a warning only, provided they returned the 
goods. Ac ting on this belief the accused had gone on her crusade. 
This, the defence claimed amounted to color of right in that the 
accused had an honest belief that if she returned the goods, the owner 
consented. 
However, the evidence designed to show that such phone call was made 
by the accused was "fuzzy" and of no consequence. Furthermore if 
there was sufficie1'.t proof of such a call it would not amount to 
consent to take goods out of the store but merely some statement of 
"no prosecution" policy. Just because one states that he would not 
prosecute his assailant if he was punched in the nose does not mean he 
consents to the assault. 
The accused simply did not take the merchandise with any colour of 
right and the interesting question arose if there is any validity in 
saying that though taking something with a colour of right is not and 
cannot be fraudulent, can something done without colour of right not 
be fraudulent. In other words, does it always follow that when sotne=' 
thing is done without colour of right that it is then automatically 
done fraudulently? If something like in this case is done unwisely, 
with naivity, or to put it bluntly, stupidly, is it then done fraudu-
lently? 
In reviewing the laws related to larceny as far back as the Roman law 
it was concluded that 
". • • fraudulently in s. 283 means a dishonest state of 
mind, leading to a dishonest intention to appropriate the 
property taken, i.e., to act with respect to it as if the 
taker were the owner although perhaps only the temporary 
owner." 
In the circumstances, it could not be said to be beyond reasonable 
doubt that such were the dishonest intentions of the accused. 
* * * * * 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Acquittal upheld. 
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WHO DECIDES TO PROSECUTE? 
Dawson v. The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada October 1983 
A criminal dispute is between the alleged perpetrator and the Sover-
eign. When the state, on behalf of the Sovereign, refuses to take up 
the cause that may not be the end of the matter. At common law, any 
person or peace officer may, on behalf of the Sovereign, inform under 
oath a Justice of the Peace of the commission of a crime (private 
prosecution). When this happens the Justice of the Peace shall hear 
and consider (ex parte) if a case is made out. If there ls he must 
issue process Tsummons or warrant compelling the appearance of the 
accused). 
The Attorneys General of the provinces have the supervisory power over 
criminal prosecutions and have a right to prevent the use of the crim-
inal process. Therefore, they were given the power to order a stay of 
any criminal proceeding. Such order cannot be appealed and the 
Attorney General's accountability for such action is strictly politi-
cal and to the Legislative Assembly. 
In this case Mr. Dawson went before a Justice of the Peace and 
preferr~d nine criminal charges against a police officer. As the 
Justice of the Peace was to conduct the mandatory hearing whether to 
issue process (a summons or warrant) the agent of the Attorney General 
directed that an entry be made on the record that the proceedings be 
stayed. t1r. Dawson appealed the Crown's right to do so and last. He 
eventually was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada which decided 
unanimously: 
"When the proceedings are commenced by an information, the 
informant in a sense prefers the information and the 
Justice of the Peace decides whether or not to find the 
information and then the next step is to issue the process 
to bring the accused before him. 
"The Attorney General's power to stay starts as of the 
moment a summons or warrant is issued". 
In relation to make a distinction for summary conviction of fences and 
indictable offences, the Court held that such disparity was undesir-
able and could not have been intended by Parliament considering the 
relevant legislation and its historical development. 
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered that the 
Justice of the Peace conduct a hearing pursuant to s. 455.3 c.c. of 
the Criminal Code. 
* * * * * 
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PllOTECTIOH OF PllIVACY 
RENEWING Alf AUTBOllIZA.TIOM ARD ll>T DISCLOSING 
THAT ADDITIONAL CllllfiRAL ACTIVITY VAS ~IS!:OVEREP 
The Queen v. Comisso Supreme Court of Canada October 1983 
Police were authorized to intercept the accused's private communica-
tion on grounds for believing that he was dealing in heroin. Towards 
the end of the period for which the authorization was issued the 
communications indicated that the accused had possession of counter-
feit money. Police told Crown Counsel and asked that this additional 
criminal activity be added to the authorization when it came up for 
renewal. The prosecutors decided that this was not necessary. The 
accused was subsequently convicted of possession of counterfeit money 
mainly due to evidence directly and indirectly derived from the wire 
tap. He successfully appealed this conviction to the B. C. Court of 
Appeal* which held that if evidence of a crime other than the one for 
which the authorization was granted, is ~~vealed unexpectedly in law-
fully intercepted communication, the evidence is admissible. However, 
where there is sufficient time to add this offence to the authoriza-
tion or particularly where it is not added at renewal while it is 
known at that time, the evidence is inadmissible. The B. C. Court of 
Appeal upheld the acquittal. 
The Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada which 
stood divided on this issue but decided 5 to 4 to allow the appeal and 
restore the conviction. Since the trial section 178.16(3.1) c.c. was 
added to the Privacy Act and both counsel took a position on the 
meaning of that section tmich seems to say that evidence obtained from 
a lawful interception of private communication is admissible whether 
or not the proceedings are related to issues or matters other than 
those specified in the authorization. 
Crown Counsel claims the se~tion 111eans that such evidence is admis-
sible regardless what the charge is. Defence counsel claims that 
renewal means an assessment of the authorization and keeping the new 
information from the issuing judge is like obtaining the authorization 
by false pretences which makes it nul and voia. This, he claims, is 
not included in the new section which only deals with "windfall" 
evidence, in other words, unexpected evidence. 
In finding for the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada did ~ say, 
that where intercepted communications have revealed additional 
criminal activities it is alright to withhold that information from 
the judge when applying for a renewal of the authorization 
* 66 C.C.C. (2d) 65 - also see Volume 9 of this publication, page 6. 
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The Privacy Act stipulates that when applying for a renewal, police 
and Crown must, among other things, inform him of "any information 
that has been obtained by any interception". (Section 178.13(3) C.C.) 
Since defence counsel conceded that the renewal was legally obtained 
the majority of the Supreme Court Justices held: 
". • • this case must be decided on the assumption that 
the judge was informed through the affidavit of what was 
heard as regards that offence (possession of counterfeit 
money). It might well be, though this need not, should 
not and is not decided on this appeal, that if the police 
on a renewal, were not to reveal such information in this 
affidavit, the renewal might have been obtained irregular-
ly, the subsequent interceptions unlawful and any evidence 
obtained through such interceptions may be inadmissible, 
be it evidence of the offence stated in the authorization, 
or a fortioci*, of any other offences, subject, of course, 
to the descretion given judges under the section to admit 
unlawfully obtained evidence". 
In addition, the Supreme Court held that evidence of offences for 
which no authorization can be granted (see 178.1 C.C.) is also admis-
sible if it was obtained by means of a lawful interception. 
Conviction restored 
* * * * * 
* With stronger reason; much more - logic to denote that if one fact 
exists, therefore one included but less improbable must also exist. 
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CAN •plJFFs• AMOUNT TO A SAMPLE OF BREATH? 
Regina v. Adkin, B. C. Court of Appeal, No. 204/82 September 1983 
According to a police witness who was present in the breathalyzer 
room, the accused gave three "puffs". of breath, the aggregate of which 
was a sample and was analyzed. The second sample was provided and 
analyzed in the same fashion. The Provincial Court Judge held that, 
due to the puffs, there was evidence to the contrary that the blood 
alcohol level at t:he time of analysis was the same as that level at 
the time of driving. He considered that the "puffs" amounted to evi-
dence that more than two samples (as certified) were taken. A County 
Court Judge reversed the Provincial Court decision and the accused 
took the matter to the Court of Appeal which concluded: 
"Evidence that the appellant puffed several times during 
the taking of a sample, did not provide any basis for 
concluding that more than two samples had been taken. The 
appellant could not, on the facts of this case, assert 
that the certificate was unreliable because there was no 
evidence of any lower reading than those referred to in 
the certificate". 
* * * * * 
"GIVING A JlEASORABLE NOTIO! OF INTENT 
AND A COPY OF THE CKllTIFICATE .. 
Regina v. McGuire, B. C. Court of Appeal, September 1983 
The accused was processed for impaired driving and at the conclusion 
of the tests, served with a true copy of the certificate of analyses. 
He was then arrested for a. completely different matter and booked in 
cells. The certificate of analyses was taken from him and police 
testified that it is routine that all personal belongings are returned 
to any prisoner upon his release. ~wever, no one could specifically 
say that the accused was upon his release given the copy of the certi-
ficate again. At t::-ial, the accused argued, of course, that the 
certificate of analyses was inadmissible as there was reasonable doubt 
that he possessed the copy for a time sufficient for him to take 
notice of its content. This issue eventually ended up in the Court of 
Appeal which agreed with the Judges who dealt with this question 
before, that it ought not to be presumed that the certificate was not 
returned to the accused upon his release. "A reasonable doubt cannot 
be founded on speculation". 
* * * * * 
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1. CAN EVIDENCE OF PRIOR DRIVING LEAD TO FINDING CARE OR OONTROL? 
2. DOES A •DEMAND• CAUSE 1llE SUBJECT TO BE DETAINED? 
3. MUST A FAILURE TO INFORM THE SUSPECT OF KIGHT TO OOUNSEL IF HE IS 
DETAINED, RESULT IN EXCLUSION OF CERTIFICATE IN EVIDENCE? 
Regina v. Hatter: 
25979, June 1983 
County Court of Vancouver Island, Victoria Reg. No. 
At 1: 25 two officers attended at the scene of an accident in which the 
ace used' s car was totally destroyed. The accused was not in his car when 
the officers arrived. He admitted that he drove his car at the time of the 
accident; that he had been drinking, and had nothing to drink since the 
accident. He was consequently convicted of "over 80 milligrams" while 
having the care or control of (instead of driving) a motor vehicle. This, 
apparently, as the Crown had no evidence at what time the accident had 
happened and hence it could not be established at what time the accused 
drove. The accused appealed. The Crown's position was that the accused had 
care or control of his car (by then a wreck) when the officers came on the 
scene. The samples of breath were analyzed within two hours of that time 
and therefore the certificate of analyses was admissible, argued the Crown. 
The defence submitted that the only evidence of care or control was when 
the accused had the accident and that standing beside one's totally demol-
ished car does not amount to care or control. The County Court Judge 
responded: 
"The appellant obviously had the care and control of the 
vehicle at the time of the accident. Whenever that may have 
been, and I do not think that that care or control ceased at 
the moment the accident occurred"*· 
The officers had made a demand of the accused to provide samples of 
breath. He had complied, gave the samples as required, was driven home, 
and issued an Appearance Notice. The officers did not at any stage of 
these events inform the accused of his rights to retain and instruct 
counsel. This, defence counsel claims, should result in all the evidence 
subsequent to the demand being inadmissible**· 
The Court disagreed and held that the decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Chromiak applied, despite the fact that Chromiak was demanded to 
* See Reasons by Supreme Court of Canada in Saunders v. The Queen (1967) 
3 c.c.c. 278. 
** See R. v. Morrison Volume 12 p. 16 of the Publication and R. v 
Davignon Volume 11 page 2 of this publication. 
*** R. v. Chromiak (1979) 12 C.RT. (3d) 300. Also see Volume 1, page 3 of 
this publication. 
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only give a sample "at roadside" where this accused was demanded to 
accompany the officers. Being arrested or detained is a requisite to being 
informed of right to counsel and the Court held that being "under demand" 
does not necessarily mean the suspect is detained. 
However, should being under demand amount to detention, in this case the 
administration of justice was not brought into disrepute by admitting the 
evidence. 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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FAULTY APPEARANCE NOTICE - DOES COURT LOSE JURISDICTION? 
Kennedy v. The Attorney General of B. C. B. C. Court of Appeal 11820742, 
September 1983 ) 
\ 
A police officer served an Appearance Notice on the accused. Everything 
was filled in except where to appear. The notice was confirmed, and an 
information sworn. The accused failed to show and the information was 
struck off the court list. Later the Justice of the Peace issued a summons 
with which the accused complied. He entered a plea of not guilty and 
promptly applied for and was granted a Court order prohibiting the Provin-
cial Court Judge from proceeding. The Supreme Court held the Provincial 
Court had lost jurisdiction over the information. The Crown appealed this 
decision to the B. C. Court of Appeal which held that the defect in the 
process by which the accused was brought before the Court is irrelevant to 
the validity of the information. 
* * * * * 
Provincial Court was ordered to 
proceed 
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URKEASOIIABLE SEAJtCH 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Gladstone, County Court gf Vancouver 
821480 June 1983 
Vancouver Registry cc 
The accused arrived at the Vancouver airport on a flight from Lima. He did 
fit the description of a possible drug carrier in relation to whom the 
Customs Officers had received an alert. 
The Customs Act states that Customs officers may search a person who comes 
into Canada from a foreign country if the officer has reasonable cause to 
suppose that the person has contraband secreted upon his person. 
The accused was taken into a "search room". He was given the above search 
provision to read. He said he understood its content and then consented to 
a body search. A "considerable quantity" of cocaine was found on him. 
At his trial for importing, the accused argued that the coca!ne should be 
inadmissible in evidence as the provisions of the Charter of Rights were 
not obs2rved. 
Firstly, he claimed that as the search was not warranted in the circum-
stances, it was unreasonable and contrary to section 8 of the Charter. 
Furthermore, the accused had not been promptly informed of his rights to 
counsel. He. therefore 0 suggested that the remedy for these constitutional 
wrongs was the exclusion of the evidence "lest the Administration of 
Justice be brought into disrepute". 
The accused was also told that should he not consent to the search he could 
be taken before the chief officer at the port, or a justice of the peace, 
who, if a search was considered justifi~d, could order the search. In 
other words, the accused was offered to have the grounds the officers had 
to search, judicially tested for adequacy. He had waived that right and 
had with an operating mind cov..sented to the search. However, the search 
was conducted prior to tha accused being informed of his rights to counsel. 
The County Court replied that the information on the law and the options 
the accused had under the enactments were so c1early and accurately stated 
and explained to him that an imbicile could have understood them. A lawyer 
could not have improved on it and would only have been able to advise his 
client that the decision on the options were for him to decide. Said the 
Court: 
"Indeed to exclude such evidence as is before me now, 
would in the eyes of sensible folk everywhere, make the 
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administration of justice the butt of more than disrepute 
• • • it would be r-egar:-Jed with derision, and rightly so. 
The essence of justice is even handedness even the gener:-al 
public has its r:-ights, one of which is to have criminals, 
after a fair trial and investigation, brought to book. It 
is always a matter of balance". 
The Judge concluded that indeed the officers should have informed the 
accused of his right to counsel, but the wrong was in these circumstances 
slight and totally out of proportion with the remedy suggested by the 
accused. 
* * * * * 
Cocaine was admitted in evi-
dence. 
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ATTEMPT SUICIDE AMOUBTING TO MURDER - TRANSFERRED IRTERT 
Re Brown and The Queen, Ontario High Court of Justice, February 1983 
4 c.c.c. (3d) 571 
When a person has the specific intent to take the life of another person, 
but by mistake kills the wrong individual, his intent is legally transfer-
able and he can be convicted of murder the same had he killed his intended 
victim. This is provided for in section 212(b) c.c. which states that such 
accident or mistake causes such homicide to be murder notwithstanding that 
he did not mean to cause harm or death to his actual victim. The requisite 
to the transferred intent is, of course, that the killer intended to take 
someone's life - what about if that life is his own? 
The accused murdered his wife and child and wanted to end his own life as 
well. He drove at a high speed on a highway and deliberately drove head-on 
into an oncoming car killing it's lone occupant. He told police at the 
scene, "I just wanted to die" and admitted to deliberately have caused the 
accident to accomplish that objective. 
The accused was committed for trial on a first degree murder charge. He 
appealed claiming that the intent was not transferable where the killer 
intended to take his own life. However, the Justice held that when a 
person kills someone else when attempting suicide, his specific intent is 
transferable. 
The High Court of Justice held that there was enough evidence to commit the 
accused for trial for second degree murder and ordered the accused to stand 
trial for the reduced charge. This as there was insufficient evidence to 
show his act had been planned and deliberate. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Regina v. Smith, County Court of Vancouver Vancouver Registry No. CC821369 
September 1983 
Section 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act states: 
"Every person who violates subsection ( 1) is guilty of an 
indictable of fence and is liable to imprisonment for life 
but not less than seven years". 
(Subsection (1) creates the offence of importing a narcotic). The accused 
claimed the 7 years imprisonment is "cruel and unusual punishment". He 
argued that the underlined portion of the section is severable from the 
rest and that only that portion is unconstitutional. In addition to it 
being contrary to section 12 of the Charter (cruel and unusual punishment) 
it also amounts to arbitrary detention claimed defence counsel. Regardless 
of the quantity of the contraband, the purpose for bringing it into the 
country or how dangerous the substance is, the minimum penalty is 7 years. 
A sentence of such duration is seldom imposed. Therefore, it is likely 
that the person bringing in a small quantity of a substance for his 
personal use will receive the same minimum penalty as the person importing 
a large quantity of a harmful substance strictly for the purpose of traf-
ficking and exploitive profits. 
Said the Court: 
"Given that situation, the disparity is so gross, it is 
shocking to contemporary society, is unnecessary in narco-
tic control and results therefore, in a punishment which 
is cruel and unusual". 
Hence the words, "but not less than seven years" are inoperable and a con-
travention of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
* * * * * 
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DOES HOVING A CAJl AR DIAPPl.ECIABLE DISTANCE AHOURT TO ·nnvING-? 
Regina v. Chessa, B. C. Court of Appeal (No. CA000657) September 1983 
The accused drank at a. hotel and reali:i:ed he was incapable to drive home. 
He phoned a cab and while waiting for it to arrive he went to check on his 
van in the parking lot to ensure it was properly parked and locked. A 
police officer observed th~ accused getting into the van and saw it "lurch 
forward", stop and back up over the curb and subsequently move forward 
again into the parking position. The accused got out of the van, locked it 
up and was apprehended while walking back to the lobby. 
The accused was acquitted in Provincial and County Court of impaired 
driving and "over 80 ml." as he did not move the 'Jan "an appreciable 
distance" and had only driven it from a purely technical viewpoint. The 
Crown had appealed these decisions. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal accepted the definition of "drive" as expressed 
by the British Lord Chief Justice*: "The essence of driving is the use of 
the driver's controls in order to direct the movement however that movement 
is produced" (gravity, being pushed or under its own power). 
The accused, by moving his van a few feet did drive and the Crown's appeal 
was allowed and a new trial ordered. However, in view of the accused's 
commendable and responsible attitude the Justices of the Court of Appeal 
expressed hope that no new trial would be conducted 
* * * * * 
* R. v. McDonagh (1974) 59 C.A.R. 55. 
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PROOF OF THERE BEING AT LEAST FIFTEEN MINUTES BETWEEN TWO EVENTS 
Regina v. Taylor - Ontario Court of Appeal - May 1983 
Police certified that a breath sample taken at 1: 12 a.m. resulted in a 
reading of "190 milligrams" and that at 1:27 a.m. a second sample showed a 
blood alcohol level of "200 milligrams". The question whether such certif-
icate is sufficient to prove that there was an interval of "at least fift-
een minutes between the times when the samples were taken" was dealt with 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal when the accused Taylor appealed his convic-
tion of impaired driving. If the answer was "No", then there would be no 
proof of the accused's blood-alcohol level at the time of driving. Lack of 
additional evidence made the admissibility of the certificate and the 
"presumption of equalization" crucial to the Crown's case. 
What is unique in this case is that the Crown and defence counsel were both 
relying on the same B. C. case for support for their respective arguments 
(R. v. Perry ( 1978) 41 C.C.C. (2d) 182 affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1980 1 S.C.R. 1124). In essence, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
interpreted the Perry case. As mentioned above, in this Taylor case the 
Crown relied exclusively on the wording of the certificate to prove that 
there was a fifteen minute interval between the taking of the two tests. 
In Perry, the operator had testified and told when and how he had taken the 
samples and analyzed them, to complement the certificate which, like that 
document in the Taylor case, gave two moments in time which were fifteen 
minutes apart (3:00 a.m. and 3:15 a.m.). The operator's testimony in Perry 
showed that "everything necessary to complete the taking of the first 
sample had been done by 3:00 a.m. and that nothing in respect to the taking 
of the second sample had been done before 15 minutes had elapsed after the 
first sample had been taken". In other words, when the B. c. Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Canada eventually, found that there was proof of the 
two tests being at least fifteen minutes apart, it did not do so exclusive-
ly on the certificate but on proof that the taking of the first sample was 
completed at least fifteen minutes before the time at which the taking of 
the second sample was commenced. As a consequence, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that a certificate which states two moments in time 15 minutes 
or even 17 minutes apart is not by · itself proof that the mandatory fifteen 
minute interval was complied with. By allowing Taylor's appeal and acquit-
ting him of impaired driving, the Court did not fail to follow the Perry 
decision but simply disagreed with the Crown that all it has to do to prove 
compliance with section 237(l)(c)(ii) c.c. is to introduce a certificate 
that mentions two periods in time which, if you subtract the first from the 
second, results in 15 minutes or even more. 
* * * * * 
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The Ontario Court of Appeal advised: 
Note: 
"I should state that, if the Crown intends to 'rely in the 
future solely on a certificate of analysis such as the one 
relied on in these proceedings in order to prove the 
existence of a 15 minute interval b~tween the times when 
samples are taken, it will have to be much more specific 
in the information contained in the certificate •••• 
Indeed, it seems to me, that where you have a certificate 
completed in the manner of the one used in the case at bar 
where the wording is identical for the time of the taking 
of the first sample and the taking of the second sample, 
the reasonable interpretation is that both samples were 
commenced at the times stated or both samples were 
completed at the times stated •••••• 
Accordingly, the information in the certificate of analy-
sis should clearly state the time at which the taking of 
the first sample was completed and the time at which the 
taking of the second sample was commenced." 
In our Province, the Criminal Justice Branch of Attorney General Ministry 
has issued new certificates which comply with this judicial advice. 
Should you be interested in the details of the submissions made to the 
Courts and their respective responses about this apparent simple question 
what "a quarter of an hour" is, and how time must be calculated, the 
following cases may be of interest: 
Regina v. Davis 32 C.C.C. (2d) 459 
Regina V o Steiger 32 C.C.C. (ed) 46 1, and 
Regina v. Temble 1 W.W.R. 1977 575 
The arguments are philosophical in nature and deal with fundamental 
questions such as "when is it 3 o'clock"? Is it three o'clock for 60 
seconds until it is 3:01? The Courts say that when we say "3 o'clock" it 
is a precise time "of no duration". Therefore, seconds become important 
when we deal with a specific or "at least" a certain period of time. 
* * * * * 
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"ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS TO PROVE 'DANGEROUS OFFENDER''" 
The Queen v. Boyd, B. C. Court of Appeal, October 1983 - Victoria Registry 
26/83 
The accused was convicted of indecently assaul ting a six year old girl. 
Due to previous similar convictions the CroWn applied at sentencing to have 
the accused declared a dangerous offender. During the hearing such 
sentence requires, the Crown adduced statements the accused made to police 
during the investigations which had led to the previous conviction. The 
fact that the statements were made by the accused was proved but not their 
voluntariness. This caused the Court to reject them. 
The Crown successfully appealed this decision and the B. C. Court of Appeal 
confirmed the Crown's position. Statements to persons in authority, 
adduced in evidence during a trial to determine guilt or innocence, must 
have been made voluntarily to be admissible. In proceedings to determine a 
sentence, only the fact that they were made by the accused needs to be 
proved. 
Crown' s appeal allowed 
* * * * * 
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"COUR.T OF CX>MPETENT JURISDICTION" 
CllAltTER OF llGBTS AND FREEDOMS 
Between Legal Servicss Society and His Honour Judge L.Cv Brahen of the B. 
C. Provincial Court, Supreme Court of B. C. April 1983 
An American citizen appeared befo~e His Honour Brahan charged with counts 
of conspiracy to import narcotics and drugs into Canada. The Judge began 
to conduct a preliminary hearing but decided that the American was in need 
of a lawyer. He was informed that the Legal Aid Society was investigating 
the accused's eligibility for legal aid but that this would not likely be 
completed for several days. 
The Judge then held that the American's rights to retain and ins true t 
counsel were being infringed in that he had no means to engage a lawyer to 
act on his behalf. This, the Judge felt, brought the matter within the 
realm of section 24 of the Charter which states that an infringement of 
Rights or Freedoms entitles a Court of competent jurisdiction to remedy the 
situation it "considers appropriate and just in the circumstances". 
Considering the Provincial Court to be a court of competent jurisdiction, 
the Judge remedied the infringement of the Charter by ordering the Legal 
Services Society to provide the American "forthwith" with legal counsel. 
The Society applied to the Supreme Court to have the order quashed. 
Our Courts are divided into two catagories: Courts of superior 
jurisdiction (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) and those of inferior 
jurisdiction. Courts of superior jurisdiction can grant injunctions and 
generally order certain things to be done despite the fact that there is no 
specific legislation providing for such an order. In other words Courts of 
superior jurisdiction ce.n go far afield to prevent or remedy harmful or 
unjust situations~ However, all courts do have inherent and statutory 
jurisdictions, and if an inferior Court wishes to remedy an infringement of 
the Charter under section 24, it can only do so by ordering something that 
inherent jurisdiction or statute enables it to do. The order issued by the 
Provincial Court judge did not fall into this catagory. 
Order quashed 
Comment: Subsection (1) of section 24 of the Charter grants a court of 
competent jurisdiction to remedy infringements of the Rights and Freedoms 
the Charter assures us. Subsection (2) creates the "exclusionary rule". 
At the outset of the Charter's existence defence lawyers petitioned 
superior Courts in the middle of trials in Provincial Court, for instance, 
to obtain a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. There was a sigh of 
relief when Courts of Appeal instructed that the trial court had to make 
those decisions, and complete the trial. When a verdict is appealed then 
- 30 -
the matter of the admissibility of evidence can be included in the grounds 
for appeal. This warded off the much feared "side tracking" process so 
prevelant in the U.S.. With this decision, that monster may be back at the 
door of our Court houses. This time in a different costume. If an 
infringement of a right or freedom is identified in the Provincial Court 
and the inherent or the statutory powers of the Judge are inadequate to 
remedy the situation, then the case may have to be adjourned and a court of 
superior jurisdiction would have to be petitioned. 
Needless to say that those who have the funds for this sort of legal 
maneuvering may well now have an opportunity for some "side tracking". 
* * * * * 
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"PRlVATE <X>HMUNICATION" 
•REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IHTEltCEPTED• 
The queen v. Samson Ontario Court of Appeal - June 1983 
A voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of the accused's 
intereepted private communications. The Crown had adduced a statement the 
accused uade prior to the interceptions to the effect that, due to his 
activities, he considered there to be a real danger that his telephone 
lines would be the subject of an authorization to intercept his 
communications. 
As a personal opinion the Justice who wrote the reasons for judgment 
expressed: 
"In these circumstances, I question that it could properly be 
said that these communicatons were made under circumstances in 
which it was reasonable for Samson as the originator to expect 
that they would not be intercepted by any pe~son other than the 
person ~-1hom he intended should receive it". 
If this opinion is accurate, then all police need to do is create a reason 
for a person to expect that his communications will be intercepted. It 
would then follow that his communications are from thereon in not private 
(if you can show his belief) and they can be intercepted with impunity and 
there should be no barrier to admissibility in evidence. 
Interesting question. 
* * * * * 
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JUDICIAL STAY OF PROCEEDINGS DUE TO DELAY 
Regina and Thompson - B.C. Court of Appeal - October 1983 Victoria Registry 
109/83 
In September 1981, the accused was involved in a fatal motor vehicle acci-
dent on Vancouver Island. She was injured and went to her parents home in 
Alberta approximately a · month after the accident and found work there. 
Police continued their investigation of the accident and contacted the 
accused in July of 1982 in the course of their inquiries. In November of 
1982 a warrant was obtained for the accused's arrest on a charge of danger-
ous driving. In view of the approaching Christmas season the officers did 
not execute the warrant or inform the accused of the charge until January 
of 1983. Even then the warrant was not executed and an arrangement was 
made between counsel that the accused would come to Vancouver Island and 
appear before a Provincial Court Judge in April of 1983 for her preliminary 
hearing. On that day defence counsel claimed that the accused's rights 
under the Charter of Rights were violated. He claimed that the length of 
time to lay the charge in addition to the unreasonable delay to inform her 
whence the charge was laid, violated her right to be tried within a reason-
able time. The Court agreed, and to remedy the situation the Judge stayed 
the proceedings. Then the Crown successfully applied for an order from the 
Supreme Court for the Provincial Court Judge to proceed. The accused 
appealed that decision. 
To determine if a delay was unreasonable the B. C. Court of Appeal said 
that the factors to be considered are: 
1. The length of the delay and its relationship to the nature and gravity 
of the offence; 
2. The reason for the delay, including whether the accused consented or 
was a party to it; 
3. If the accused asserted his rights promptly; and 
4. The prejudice to the accused. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal implied that the accused consented to the delay 
and did not assert her rights promptly. She consented to the April date 
for the preliminary hearing and when she appeared she objected claiming 
unreasonable delay. 
The Provincial Court Judge was instructed to conduct the preliminary 
hearing. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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OBLITERATED IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS 
PKESUMPTION THAT CAil IS STOLEN ARD THAT POSSESSOR DOWS THAT 
Re Boyle and The Queen - 5 c.c.c. (3d) 193 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
Section 312(2) C.C. provides that obliterated identification numbers on 
motor vehicles are in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof 
that the vehicle was obtained by the commission of an indictable offence. 
The section. further presumes that a person who possesses a vehicle with 
obliterated identification numbers knows that it was obtained by the com-
mission of an indictable offence. 
The accused who possessed a car with obliterated identification numbers was 
committed for trial for possession of stolen property. The Crown had 
depended on the presumption of knowledge provided by section 312(2) C.C. 
The accused appealed claiming that the section violates the presumption of 
innocence and is therefore constitutionally invalid. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal found that t:he section provides two presump-
tions. The first 01.'le is that we may presume that a car with obliterated 
identification numbers was obtained by the commission of an indictable 
offence. The second one is that the person who possesses such a motor 
vehicle is presumed to have guilty knowledge that the vehicle was so 
obtained. 
The Court had no problems with the first presumption and said: "The 
obliteration of the vehicle identification number even in the absence of 
any presumption is strongly probative of the illegal history of the 
vehicle". 
The second presumption, the one in rettpect to guilty k~owledge, however, 
was found to be contrary to the presumption of innocence. The Court, in 
essence, applied its own devised test to this reversed onus provision, to 
determine if it was excessive in respect to the presumption of innocence. 
Every statutory or common law presumption of a fact has prerequisite 
facts. For instance., before it may be presumed that a person has culpable 
knowledge of a vehicle's illegal history, the Crown must prove that the 
accused had possession of the vehicle and that its identification numbers 
were obliterated. If the facts to be presumed (guilty knowledge) is not a 
pa:obable or at least a reasonable consequence· of the prerequisite facts 
(possession and obliterated numbers) then the provision of the presumption 
is excessive. 
This presumption applies equally to persons who may not even be able to 
tell you where the engine is mounted (never mind the identification 
numbers) and a used car dealer who may not adhere to the noblest consumer-
service ethics but who knows a stolen car when he sees one. Furthermore 
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the possession does not have to be "recent" in regards to the time the 
theft occurred. The presumption even applies to Auntie Matilda who inheri-
ted the car from grandpa who bought it in good faith. 
This all means that: 
a jury, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is 
required by Parliament to find that the accused had the neces-
sary guilty knowledge even if there is no probative evidence 
that the accused in fact had such knowledge". 
One may say that Auntie Matilda could never be convicted if this woman, the 
epitemy of credibility, took the stand. If her testimony would not amount 
to "evidence to the contrary" and not only creates a reasonable doubt but 
proves innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, nothing will. However, the 
fact that no police officer or prosecutor would accuse Auntie Matilda and 
that no conviction is likely to result, is not the test. The fact that the 
presumption may put her in a position of having to disprove (on the balance 
of probabilities) that she had no guilty knowledge contravenes the right to 
be considered innocent until proven guilty. 
The Court, as stated above, held that evidence of an obliterated identifi-
cation number is constitutionally appropriate proof that a vehicle or a 
part thereof was obtained by the commission of an indictable offence. This 
coupled with the doctrine of "recent possession" is capable of proving 
guilty knowledge on the part of the possessor of such a vehicle. However, 
the presumption of knowledge as provided in s. 312(2) c.c. is constitution-
ally excessive. 
Accused's appeal allowed. 
Committal for trial quashed 
* * * * * 
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IS POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA A LESSER. AND INCLUDED IN CULTIVATING MAllIJUANA? 
Regina v. Powell - B. C. Court of Appeal CA 000363 Vancouver November 24, 
1983 
Mrs. Powell, the accused, split up with her husband in January. In May 
hubbie came back to the homestead to plant marijuana plants over the objec-
tions of his wife who occupied the place. The accused did not enforce her 
objections as her husband was the joint owner of the property. In July, 
the husband transferred the property in the accused's name. A few days 
late-r -p\Jllice came and found nearly 300 marijuana plants on the property. 
The accused was charged. with cultivating marijuana~ but the jury returned a 
verdict of possession of marijuana as an included offence. She appealed 
the verdict, not posing the question if in the circumstances she could have 
been convicted of "possession" had she been so charged, but whether 
"possession .. is an offence included in "cultivation". 
To determine if one offence is included in another the included offence 
must (1) be described in the enactment creating the principal offence; (2) 
it must be described in the count charged*; or (3} at common law, the 
offence is one of necessity to commit the principal offence. 
Here are some examples respectively: 
1. A person is charged with "aggravated assault" under section 245.2(2) 
c.c. If the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
victim was (as defined in section 245.2(1) C.C.) wounded, maimed, 
or disfigured, or that his life was endangered, but substantiates that 
the accused assaulted the victim then he can be convicted of the 
included offence of assault. This, as assault is described in the 
section (enactment). 
2. A person is charged with attempted murder. If the count in the 
indictment does not describe any mor~ then "that he did attempt to 
murder", there is no included offence. Should the Crown fail to prove 
specific intent on the part of the accused to take the life of his 
victim, he must be acquitted despite the heinous things the evidence 
may show be did to the victim. However, should, for instance, the 
count describe that he attempted to murder his victim by "administer-
ing noxious things" then if the specific ·intent to cause death is not 
proved, the accused may be convicted of the included offence under 
section 229 C.C. This as the offence of "administering noxious 
things" was described in the count as a means by which the accused 
alledgedly intended to take the life of his victim. 
* See section 589(1) of the Criminal Code 
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3 The common law provision for one offence being included in a more 
grave offence is the one that had to be considered in this case. It 
only arises, of course, when the enactment or the count does not 
describe a lesser offence. The test to determine if there is at 
common law, an included offence is quite simple. If a certain offence 
cannot be committed without committing also a lesser offence, then 
that lesser offence is included. In other words, the lesser offence 
must be an act of necessity to commit the major offence. Or to do 
this test backwards, it has been said: "If the whole offence charged 
can be committed without committing another offence, that other 
offence is not included."* .But, for example, one cannot commit theft 
without being in possession of stolen property; or cannot one drive 
without having the care or control of a motor vehicle? 
The test then to be applied in this case is if the accused could be 
cultivating marijuana (the alleged offence) without being in possession of 
marijuana. On the surface the question seems outright stupid, and one is 
inclined to answer unhesitatingly, "No". 
Quoting the Ontario Court of Appeal**, the Court observed that cultivating 
is "restricted to activities associated with the growing of plants" and 
does not include the process of "maturing the plants, after they were 
picked, by drying or curing". 
The Crown, to prove cultivation, had to show that the accused took an 
active part in the growing of the prohibited plants. It had not met this 
need. And to support that "possession" is an included offence, the Crown 
had to convince the Court that "cultivation" of a plant is impossible 
without "possessing" it. The Court responded: 
"Clearly, one can bestow labour and attention upon land in 
order to raise a crop without being in possession of the crop". 
Then there was an additional problem for the Crown. If proceeded by 
indictment, both offences carry the same penalty. Therefore the one is not 
"lesser" than the other and may consequently not be included. However, the 
Court did not answer that question. 
Appeal allowed 
Verdict of not guilty entered. 
Note: The question of the offences carrying the same penalty and the one 
therefore not being a lesser of fence to the other was addressed in Ferguson 
v. The Queen (1961) 132 c.c.c. 112. The Supreme Court of Canada held that 
the included offence need not be lesser in terms of gravity or penalty. 
All that matters is whether to commit the principal offence it is necessary 
to commit the offence sought to be included. 
* R. v. Carey (1972) 10 C.C.C. (2d) 330. 
** R. v. Gauvreau (1982) 65 C.C.C. (2d) 316 
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Another matter of interest is where the description of the included offence 
is in only one of the subsections that define the principal offence. For 
instance, section 302 c.c. defines that robbery is stealing where 
(a) resietence to the theft was overcome by violence or threat of 
violence; 
(b) any person , at th~ time of the theft or immediately before or after 
the thef'i:, is woundec. beaten, struck or subjected to violence; 
(c) any person ie assaulted with intent to steal irom him; or 
(d) steals from any person while armed. 
One could say that someone could commit robbery without committing 
assault. After all, under (d) no assault needs to take place. Therefore, 
the latter ought not to be included in the former a However, the B. c. 
Court of Appeal held* to have an included offence~ "the lesser offence need 
not to be included in all of the definitions of the offence charged". The 
judgment implied that where the Crown depends on the included offence being 
described in the enactment it must necessarily be included in one of the 
definitions. Therefore, "assault" is an included offence to robbery if it 
is proved by the evidence adduced in a trial for robbery, even where it is 
not mentioned in the count. 
* * * * * 
* Luckett v. The Queen (1980) 50 c.c.c. (2d) 489 
